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PROTECTING RETIRED WORKERS 
FROM INFLATION: COLLECTIVE 
BARGAINING FOR RETIREE 
BENEFITS 
Richard M. Bank* 
Thomas C. Woodrufr'* 
Today, nearly twenty million workers in the private sector are 
participants in defined benefit pension plans negotiated as a re-
sult of collective bargaining agreements. These twenty million 
workers represent nearly two-thirds of all private sector workers 
participating in defined benefit pension plans. · 
Defined benefit pension plans guarantee a specific dollar 
amount for the worker at the time of retirement.1 The high in-
flation rate of recent years, however, has begun to weaken seri-
ously the value of this guarantee. For example, with only a five 
percent inflation rate, the value of a $100 pension declines to $61 
• Member of the District of Columbia and West Virginia Bars. B.A., 1964, Colgate 
University; J.D., 1967, University of Pennsylvania. 
•• Executive Director, President's Commission on Pension Policy. S.B., 1970, M.C.P., 
1973, PhD. 1974, Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 
1 The most common type of collectively-bargained defined benefit plan calls for a 
fixed dollar benefit per month for every year of service. This is the so-called "flat bene-
fit" plan. The fixed amount in the formula is subject to bargaining each negotiating ses-
sion-usually every three years-and frequently this number is increased through what 
is called an "ad hoc adjustment" so that the defined benefit provides what is considered 
by the bargaining parties to be an adequate replacement of preretirement earnings. 
Another, less common type of private sector collectively-bargained defined benefit 
plan is the "final-average-pay" plan. This type of plan usually provides a benefit based 
on the workers' final (or high) three or five years of salary or wage. The benefit is there-
fore automatically increased as the level of salary or wages increases. Because of this 
automatic process, changes in the benefit formula in final average pay plans are much 
less frequent than in flat benefit plans. Nevertheless, once a worker retires under a "fi-
nal-average-pay" plan, the worker's need for adjustments to make up for the erosion over 
time of pension value is the same as that of a worker who retires under a "flat benefit" 
plan. 
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in ten years; with a ten percent inflation rate it declines to $39.2 
Several private sector surveys indicate that despite the recog-
nized effect of inflation on the value of pensions, few private sec-
tor plans provide for automatic pension benefit increases. 3 Even 
among such plans, a "cap" limiting benefit increases to a three 
percent to five percent increase in the Consumer Price Index is 
common. Virtually all collectively-bargained pension plans rely 
on ad hoc benefit adjustments that occur at each round of col-
lective ·bargaining to stabilize the value of their pensions as in-
flation increases.• 
Before 1971, unions were not barred explicitly from forcing 
employers to bargain over increased benefits for retired workers; 
or from striking if employers refused union demands on behalf 
of retirees. That year, however, the United States Supreme 
Court handed down the landmark case of Allied Chemical & Al-
kali Workers Local 1 v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co.r, The Court 
• The following table illustrates the effect of inflation on retirement income: 
Real Value of Retirement Income 
Based on Initial 
Replacement Rate of 100 Percent 
(Figures are percentages of initial retirement income) 
YEARS IN NO 3% ANNUAL 5% ANNUAL 10% ANNUAL 
RETIREMENT INFLATION INFLATION INFLATION INFLATION 
0 100 100 100 100 
5 100 86 78 62 
10 100 74 61 39 
15 100 64 48 24 
20 100 55 38 15 
25 100 48 30 9 
R. CLARK, THE ROLE OF PRIVATE PENSIONS IN MAINTAINING LMNG STANDARDS 
IN RETIREMENT 42 (1977). 
• See R. MYERS, INDEXATION OF PENSION AND OTHER BENEFITS 124 (1978). 
• Id. at 116-28. 
0 404 U.S. 157 (1971). In Pittsburgh Plate Glass, the employer and union had negoti-
ated an agreement under which the employer contributed toward the cost of an em-
ployee group health insurance plan in which retirees participated. While this agreement 
was in force, the employer notified the retirees, without first bargaining with the union, 
that they could individually withdraw from the negotiated group plan, in which case the 
employer would make contributions toward a program of supplemental medicare premi-
ums. The union argued that benefits for already retired employees were a mandatory 
subject of bargaining and that the employer could not make the offer it did unilaterally. 
The Supreme Court disagreed, ruling that unions had no right to force employers to 
bargain over retirees' benefits. 
The Supreme Court based its decision on two critical findings. Because retirees had 
severed the1nselves from employment, the Supreme Court found that legally they were 
no longer "employees." Id. at 172. Therefore, the Court held that an employer has no 
legal duty to bargain about retiree benefits when a union raises the issue. Id. at 165. The 
Court also found that because the interests o( active workers and the interests of retirees 
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held in Pittsburgh Plate Glass that an employer has no legal 
duty to negotiate over retiree benefits should a union raise the 
issue during the collective bargaining process. 8 As a result of the 
decision, unions could no longer force employers to discuss re-
tiree benefits or strike if the employer ignored the demand. 
Pittsburgh Plate Glass left retirees without any real representa-
tion at the bargaining table. The Court forced them to rely upon 
the good will of their former employers for possible post-retire-
ment pension benefit increases. 
Identical legislation has been introduced in both houses of 
Congress to overturn Pittsburgh Plate Glass' by making retiree 
benefits a "mandatory subject of bargaining."8 Under such legis-
lation, if a union placed the question of retiree benefits on the 
table during the course of collective bargaining, the employer 
would be under a legal obligation to negotiate about it. If the 
parties could not reach agreement on the question of such bene-
fits, the union would have the right to strike to enforce its de-
mands on behalf of retirees. 
While legislation to make retiree benefits a mandatory subject 
of bargaining would give unions new power to push for retiree 
benefits, the effectiveness of this or other attempts to provide a 
mechanism for protecting retirees against inflation through the 
collective bargaining process is open to question. Today, when 
nearly twenty million workers in the private sector are partici-
pants in defined benefit pension plans negotiated in the collec-
tive bargaining process,9 the current high rate of inflation in the 
United States economy forces reappraisal of the mechanisms for 
providing inflation protection for retired workers. The purpose 
of this article is to explore whether the collective bargaining pro-
cess in its present form, or with certain modifications, can pro-
vide workers with meaningful protection against inflation. Part I 
may well collide, retirees cannot be included within a unit of active workers represented 
by a union in collective bargaining negotiations. Id. at 172-73. However, a. union does not 
even have a legal duty to attempt to raise the issue of benefits for retirees. Id. at 182. 
•Id.at 165. 
• H.R. 1145 and S. 1473, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979). Similar legislation had been 
introduced in previous sessions of Congress. 
• The bills are so broadly drafted that unions would not be limited to bargaining for 
catch-up pension increases for retirees. Under their provisions, a union could press for 
extension of benefits in any area a1fecting retirees (such as medical benefits). Presumably 
a union could even demand the institution of pensions and other benefits for groups of 
retirees who previously had not been entitled to them. 
• These 20 million workers represent nearly two-thirds of all private sector workers 
participating in defined benefit pension plans. A majority of both workers and manage-
ment prefer defined benefit plans over other types of pension plans. Louis Harris and 
Associates, Study of American Attitudes Toward Pensions and Retirement (1979). 
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. 
evaluates the adequacy of the collective bargaining process by 
examining the internal dynamics of unions, the interests of em-
ployers and the application of the doctrine of fair representation 
to collective bargaining. After concluding that the current sys-
tem inadequately protects retirees, Part II proposes alternative 
methods to strengthen the role of retirees in the collective bar-
gaining process. 
I. COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AS A MECHANISM TO PROTECT THE 
VALUE OF PENSIONS 
In collective bargaining, the parties come to the bargaining ta-
ble with demands and expectations but not with guarantees. To 
· reach agreement with the employer, a union necessarily must 
balance, compromise, and trade off the interests of the groups it 
represents. Inevitably, the bargaining process results in agree-
ments that benefit some groups more than others. If the goal is 
to protect retirees' benefits from inflation on a consistent basis, 
the question becomes whether a freewheeling give-and-take pro-
cess like collective bargaining is adequate to the task. Putting 
aside the crucial role of the employer who is free, with some ex-
ceptions, to veto union proposals not in its own interest, the an-
swer depends upon whether unions have as strong ·an institu-
tional interest in representing retirees as they do in representing 
active workers. 
A. The Internal Political Dynamics of Unions and the 
Interests of Employers 
Unions undoubtedly feel strong moral obligations to retirees, 
many of whom helped build the union movement in its infancy. 
Nevertheless, the institutional political structure of many, if not 
most, unions dictates that any conflicts between the interests of 
active workers and retirees be resolved in favor of active work-
ers. Under the law, union officers must be elected.10 Yet, unions 
generally do not extend voting membership to retirees.11 Conse-
•• Landrum-Griffin Act of 1959 (Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act), § 
401, 29 U.S.C. § 481 (1976) [hereinafter cited as LMRDA], requires the election of inter-
national, intermediate, and local union officials by convention or referendum at specified 
intervals. 
11 Federal law does not generally limit a union's discretion to decide its own conditions 
of membership. See LMRDA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1976); Moynahan v. Para-Mutuel 
Employees Guild of Cal., Local 280, 317 F.2d 209 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 911 
0 
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quently, to stay in office, officers of most unions must respond 
predominantly to the interests of active workers. Nowhere are 
those interests more important than in the collective bargaining 
arena .where the economic welfare of workers and their families 
is at stake. 
Furthermore, in many unions, rank and file members must ap-
prove tentative collective bargaining agreements before they be-
come effective. Because retirees generally may not retain union 
membership, they have no right to vote upon proposed agree-
ments, even upon those provisions that affect their benefits. 12 
Because only those who are union members, i.e., active workers, 
vote under a ratification system, the likelihood of contract ap-
proval is negligible unless the expectations of active workers are 
satisfied. Therefore, where ratification is the rule, to assure the 
successful conclusion of a collective bargaining agreement, union 
negotiators must tailor the agreement to the needs of active 
workers voting on the contract, regardless of the equities. 
No incentive exists for unions to allow retirees to vote on rati-
fication because, since the decision in Pittsburgh Plate Glass, 
unions may not strike over the issue of retiree benefits. If retir-
ees were allowed to vote, especially where they composed a large 
part of a union's jurisdiction, or where balloting over contract 
approval was likely to be close, they could defeat a proposed col-
lective bargaining agreement if dissatisfied with provisions made 
for them. The union would then be on the horns of a dilemma, 
as any attempt to force the employer to renegotiate provisions 
for retirees would violate the law.18 In the absence of such an 
attempt, ratification might become impossible. 
Active workers and retirees do share some common interests, 
(1963). Some state courts have held that unions, as voluntary associations, are free to set 
their own conditions of membership. E.g., Walter v. McCarvel, 309 Mass. 260, 34 N.E.2d 
677 (1941); Havens v. Detroit Motion Picture Projectionists, 338 Mich. 418, 61 N.W.2d 
790 (1953) (equally divided court). However, other state courts have held that because of 
a union's quasi-public nature, unions may not establish membership criteria which un-
reasonably deny membership to those actively employed in the trade or occupation over 
which a union has jurisdiction. E.g., Pirectors Guild of America, Inc. v. Superior Court, 
64 Cal. 2d 42, 409 P.2d 934, 48 Cal. Rptr. 710 (1966). No court has held, however, that a 
union must accept as members those retired from a trade or occupation over which it has 
jurisdiction. Nevertheless, a few well known unions such as the United Mineworkers and 
the United Steelworkers do offer voting membership to retirees. 
11 C/. Branch 6000, Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers v. NLRB, 595 F.2d 808 (D.C. Cir. 
1979) (active non-union workers have no right to vote upon local union agreements af-
fecting their working conditions); LMRDA, § lOl(a)(l), 29 U.S.C. § 4ll(a)(l) (1976) 
(only union members guaranteed right to participate in union affairs). 
11 National Labor Relations Act of 1935, § 8(b)(3), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(3) 
(1976) [hereinafter cited as NLRA]; Allied Chemical and Alkali Workers, Local 1 v. 
Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. 167 (1971). 
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however. For example, active workers will someday be retirees 
and have a real interest in seeing, through periodic benefit in-
creases, that retirees' pensions are adequate. This is particularly 
true of older workers. Nevertheless, wages and non-retirement 
fringe benefits directly and immediately benefit active workers. 
Predictably, these will be the highest financial priority of active 
workers during collective bargaining. Logically, this tendency 
should be strongest during periods of high inflation when im-
mediate financial pressures upon active workers are the heaviest. 
Yet, it is precisely at such times that retirees also will need the 
greatest relief through ad hoc benefit increases. With the inter-
nal structural dynamics of most unions favoring the needs of ac-
tive workers, the result is that when retirees need substantial 
pension increases the most, they may be least likely to receive 
them. 
Employers have only a minimal degree of self-interest in 
granting benefits to retirees, despite the fact that many employ-
ers do grant pension increases to retirees. Regardless of self-in-
terest and the Pittsburgh Plate Glass decision, numerous em-
ployers have granted pension increases for retirees either 
unilaterally or as the product of collective bargaining. The ques-
tion here, however, is whether employer good will is a reliable 
source of protection against inflation. Because retirees have sev-
ered themselves from active employment, they do not contribute 
to the productivity or success of the employer's business. Thus, 
the satisfaction of retirees has little practical consequence for an 
employer's day-to-day operations. In contrast, the satisfaction of 
active workers with their wages and working conditions has di-
rect bearing upon their morale, and consequently upon the em-
ployer's operations in terms of productivity and labor relations. 
Thus, usually the employer benefits by favoring the interests of 
active workers over those of retirees.14 
B. The Doctrine of Fair Representation 
With the institutional forces promoting the collective bargain-
ing interests of retirees so weakly, a question arises as to how 
retirees could be guaranteed proper representation at the bar-
gaining table even if unions were given real power to represent 
them. Traditionally the mechanism for promoting proper repre-
" There are, however, boundaries to these dynamics. If an employer were to neglect 
the needs of retirees completely, the morale of certain workers, looking forward to their 
own eventual retirement, might well be adversely affected. 
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sentation has been a judically-erected doctrine known as the 
duty of fair representation.111 The doctrine, a broad equitable 
corollary of the grant to unions of exclusive power to represent 
collective bargaining interests, simply requires that the power 
delegated to unions be exercised fairly in behalf of whomever a 
union has been empowered to act. 
The right of active workers who are "employees" within a 
"bargaining unit"18 to fair representation by a union is the most 
familiar application of this general equitable principle, but the 
right to fair representation is theoretically applicable to whom-
ever a union represents. For example, in Steele v. Louisville & 
Nashville Railroad Co.,17 the landmark case announcing the 
doctrine of fair representation, the Supreme Court defined its 
scope under the National Labor Relations Act in the broadest 
possible terms: 
We hold that the language of the Act to which we have 
referred, read in light of the purposes of the Act, ex-
presses the aim of Congress to impose on the bargaining 
representative of a craft or class of employees the duty to 
exercise fairly the power conferred upon it in behalf of 
all those for whom it acts, without hostile discrimination 
against them. 18 
The Supreme Court has· since confirmed the wide sweep of the 
duty of fair representation in Railroad . Trainmen v. Howard. 19 
There, the Supreme Court held that, even against employees it 
did not represent, a union may not exercise power to bargain 
unfairly. 
More recently, in Nedd v. United Mine Workers20 a case di-
•• The reciprocal terms "duty of fair representation" and "right to fair representation" 
will be used interchangeably here depending upon the context. 
18 See discussion of terms "employees" and "bargaining units" in Pittsburgh Plate 
Glass, 404 U.S. at ·165-76. 
17 323 U.S. 192 (1944). In Steele, the Supreme Court applied the duty of fair represen-
tation to unions under the jurisdiction of the Railway Labor Act. The Supreme Court 
later extended the duty to unions under the jurisdiction of the NLRA. Ford Motor Co. v. 
Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 (1953). 
•• Steele v. Louisville & N. R.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192, 202-03 (1944). 
•• 343 U.S. 768 (1952). 
· •• 556 F.2d 190 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1013 (1978). In Nedd, the union 
voluntarily undertook tQ collect royalties from employers due to a pension fund from 
which retirees received benefits. Certain retirees alleged that the union had been lax in 
this endeavor, and sued the union, in part, on the theory that the union had failed to 
represent retirees' interests fairly. The union argued, under Pittsburgh Plate Glass, that 
because retirees were not "employees" or "bargaining unit members," it had no legal 
duty of fair representation towards retirees. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals rejected 
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rectly on point, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that a 
union must represent the interests of retirees fairly, notwith-
standing the fact that (1) retirees are neither "employees" nor 
"bargaining unit members," and (2) the union had voluntarily 
undertaken to represent retirees, even though the union had no 
legal duty to do so.11 Relying upon the Supreme Court's decision 
in Howard, the court in Nedd recognized the union's duty to 
represent fairly all of those for whom a union acts whether in-
side or outside the bargaining unit. 1112 
The Nedd decision properly distinguishes the considerations 
relevant to mandatory bargaining from those relevant to fair 
representation. The Supreme Court in Pittsburgh Plate Glass 
found the nexus between retirees, on the one hand, and their 
former employers and active employees on the other to be ex-
tremely tenuous. This finding led the Court to conclude that a 
union need not represent retirees, and that an employer has no 
legal duty to bargain about retirees' benefits. However, this deci-
sion implies neither that a union may not voluntarily undertake 
to represent retirees nor that an employer may not agree to bar-
gain about their interests. Where such bargaining occurs, no rea-
son exists to allow the union to ignore efforts on behalf of retir-
ees. Consequently, regardless of Pittsburgh Plate Glass, under 
existing law, where a union actually does represent retirees' in-
terests, it owes retirees a duty of fair representation. 
1. The application of the doctrine of fair representation in 
the context of collective bargaining- Fair representation issues 
arise at every stage of the bargaining process-in the formula-
tion of contract demands, in agreement upon contractual provi-
sions, and in the administration of the agreed contract. In 
Steele, the Supreme Court set the parameters of a union's duty 
of fair representation in the negotiating context. The Court re-
quired that any "unfavorable effects" upon particular groups the 
union represents which result from bargaining be based upon 
"relevant differences" between those groups and other groups 
the union represents.18 
this contention outright, holding that while the union was under no legal obligation to 
represent retirees' interests, "[h)aving undertaken, on behalf of the Fund to enforce the 
employers' obligation to pay royalties, the Union was not then entitled to act in a man-
ner which discriminated against the pensioners." Id. at 200. 
91 Id. at 199-200 . 
.. The court in Nedd stated that "(f)ederal common law implied from the statutory 
authority conferred upon collective bargaining representatives has recognized the need to 
place limitations upon the power of the recognized bargaining representative to injure 
minorities inside and outside the bargaining unit." Id. at 200 (emphasis added) . 
.. Steele v. Louisville & N. R.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192, 203 (1944). 
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Even though requiring unions to premise distinctions upon 
"relevant differences," the Supreme Court has recognized that 
unions must have significant leeway-a "wide range of reasona-
bleness" -in bargaining.14 The parameters of a "wide range of 
reasonableness" bounded by a duty to act upon "relevant differ-
ences" are unclear. Some courts have analyzed contractual pro-
visions negotiated to determine if they are, on some minimal 
level, based upon differences which make objective sense.111 
Other courts have hewn a more restrictive line and refused to 
overturn union bargaining conduct in the absence of explicit al-
legations and proof of bad faith or hostility towards a particular 
group the union represents. 18 In the absence of hostility or irra-
tionality, courts have approved negotiated forced retirement of 
older workers,17 super-seniority for union officials,18 differential 
seniority systems favoring the rights of some union members 
over others,19 differential seniority systems favoring union over 
non-union employees,80 and the termination of non-vested pen-
sion rights. 81 A number of courts have attempted to build into 
the duty of fair representation a requirement to consider and 
.. Thus, in upholding preferential seniority provisions negotiated for returning veter-
ans, the Court said: 
Any authority to negotiate derives its principal strength from a delegation to 
the negotiators of a discretion to make such concessions and accept such advan-
tages as, in light of all relevant considerations, they believe will best serve the 
interests of the parties represented. A major responsibility of negotiators is to 
weigh the relative advantages and disadvantages of differing proposals .... In-
evitably differences arise in the manner and degree to which the terms of any 
negotiated agreement affect individual employees and classes of employees. The 
mere existence of such differences does not make them invalid. The complete 
satisfaction of all who are represented is hardly to be expected. A wide range of 
reasonableness must be allowed a statutory bargaining representative in serving 
the unit it represents, subject always to complete good faith and honesty of pur-
pose in the exercise of its discretion. 
Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 337-38 (1953). This "wide range of reasonable-
ness" is, of course, circumscribed by the duty to act upon "relevant considerations." 
16 Hargrove v. Brotherhood of R.R. Locomotive Eng'rs, 116 F. Supp. 3, 8 (D.D.C. 
1953) ("Here the discrimination based on prior employment and geography alone are 
... irrelevant and invidious."). 
16 Gainey v. Brotherhood of Ry. and S.S. Clerks, 313 F.2d 318 (3d Cir. 1963); Hardcas-
tle v. Western Greyhound Lines, 303 F.2d 182 (9th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 920 
(1962). 
17 Roberts v. Lehigh & New England Ry., 323 F.2d 219 (3d Cir. 1963); Goodlin v. 
Clinchfield R.R., 229 F.2d 578 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 953 (1956) . 
.. Aeronautical Ind. Dist. Lodge 727 v. Campbell, 337 U.S. 521 (1949). 
19 Deboles v. Trans World Airlines Inc., 552 F.2d 1005 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 
837 (1977). 
80 Beriault v. Local 40, Super Cargoes & Checkers of the lnt'l Longshoremen's & 
Warehousemen's Union, 445 F. Supp. 1287 (D. Ore. 1978). 
11 Dwyer v. Climatical Industries, Inc., 544 F.2d 307 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 
1932 (1977). 
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take into account in decisionmaking the interests of minorities 
within the union.32 No court, however, has required a union to 
comply with its duty of fair representation by attempting to ne-
gotiate contractual provisions which meet speqific substantive 
benefit levels or standards.33 
By and large, regardless of the formal rubric, courts are con-
cerned primarily with the process by which a union makes nego-
tiating decisions and not with what the union actually negoti-
ates. Consequently, even assuming retirees were entitled to a 
duty of fair representation, it would be difficult to argue success-
fully under existing law that unions must attempt to negotiate 
pension increases for retirees at any particular level, for im;tance 
one which would offset inflation or equal benefits of active 
workers. 
2. Inadequacy of relief under the traditional doctrine of fair 
representation- Even if retirees could establish a violation of 
their rights, certain difficulties concerning the proper remedy 
arise. Although the Supreme Court ruled early that breach of 
the duty of fair representation entails "the usual judicial reme-
0 Several courts have outlawed discriminatory procedural conduct that would be es-
pecially harmful to the interests of retirees were retirees to become entitled to the right 
of fair representation. For instance, retirees, because they generally are not entitled to 
vote in union matters, are weak politically, and several courts have explicitly ruled that 
unions may not make negotiating decisions on the basis of the relative political power of 
factions within the union. Ferro v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 296 F.2d 847, 851 (7th 
Cir. 1961) ("[I]t is not proper for a bargaining agent in representing the employees to 
draw distinctions among them which are based upon their political power within the 
union."); Barton Brands, Ltd. v. NLRB, 529 F.2d 793, 798 (7th Cir. 1976) ("[D]ecisions 
may not be made solely for the benefit of a stronger, more politically favored group over 
a minority group."); see also Truck Drivers and Helpers Local 568 v. NLRB, 379 F.2d 
137, 142-43 (D.C. Cir. 1967)(union's duty of fair representation breached where its advo-
cacy of a position prefened by a majority group is supported only by the "purely politi-
cal motivation of winning an election"). Likewise, discrimination by unions against non-
members is uniformly condemned. Branch 6000, Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers v. NLRB, 
595 F.2d 808 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Jones v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 495 F.2d 790, 797 (2d 
Cir. 1974). Because retirees generally are not allowed to participate in the contract ratifi-
cation process, active workers decide what benefit increases retirees will receive in any 
given collective bargaining agreement. Consequently, should majority approval of con-
tract provisions which discriminate against retirees legitimize them, the right to fair rep-
resentation would become meaningless for retirees. A few courts have indicated that ma• 
jority approval of discriminatory contract provisions does not insulate unions from 
charges of unfair representation. Barton Brands, Ltd. v. NLRB, 529 F.2d 793, 793 (7th 
Cir. 1976); see also Branch 6000, Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Caniers v. NLRB, 595 F.2d 808 
(D.C. Cir. 1979). Another court has taken the contrary view. Roberts v. Lehigh & New 
England Ry., 323 F.2d 219 (3d Cir. 1963). 
0 But see O'Donnell v. Pabst Brewing Co., 12 Wis. 2d 491, 500, 107 N.W.2d 484, 489 
(1961) ("The overall consideration is whether the bargaining ... was in good faith and 
reached a fair and reasonable solution to the merger problem"). 
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dies of injunction and award of damages, "84 applying this relief 
where future financial benefits are at stake might be difficult for 
several reasons discussed so far. One of the primary obstacles is 
that the measure of damages would be unclear. Also, in cases 
covering large numbers of retirees, courts face the problem that 
awarding appropriate damages to retirees might destroy the 
union's fiscal viability and, thus, its future bargaining capacity. 
Finally, employers have a legitimate business interest in protec-
ting their pocketbooks, and for a court to award damages against 
an employer merely for striking a hard bargain that adversely 
affects retirees would be difficult to justify. 
Fair representation decisions overturning union collective bar-
gaining actions usually involve situations where previously ac-
crued rights have been bargained away.811 In such cases, the 
courts can easily determine the remedy because preceding col-
lective bargaining agreements provide a readily ascertainable 
measure of relief. For example, where previously existing senior-
ity rights have been forfeited, courts need only order their resto-
ration. 88 However, where a court found that a union had unfairly 
represented the interests of retirees in bargaining over future 
benefit increases, no such norm would be available. The court 
would have to step into the shoes of the parties and decide what 
should have been negotiated. Past agreements might provide 
some guidance; but because financial benefit packages are nego-
tiated in the context of the current fiscal picture, such guidance 
would not be determinative. In essence, the court would have to 
decide how the union should have split what it obtained from 
the employer between active workers and retirees .. This specula-
tive judgment is outside the normal range of judicial expertise, 
and courts should entertain such deliberations only with the 
greatest reluctance. 
Courts also would be reluctant to make large damage awards 
jeopardizing the fiscal stability of offending unions. In Electrical 
. Workers v. Foust87 the Supreme Court addressed the issue of 
whether punitive damages could be awarded against unions 
breaching their duty of fair representation. The Court rejected 
the possibility of punitive damages in fair representation cases 
14 Steele v. Louisville & N. R.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192 (1944); Mount v. International Bhd. 
of Locomotive Eng'rs, 226 F.2d 604, 608 (6th Cir. 1955). 
'" See, e.g., Jones v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 495 F.2d 790 (2d Cir. 1974); Mount v. 
International Bhd. of Locomotive Eng'rs, 226 F.2d 604 (6th Cir. 1955) . 
.. Mount v. International Bhd. of Locomotive Eng'rs, 226 F.2d 604 (6th Cir. 1955); 
Hargrove v. Brotherhood of R.R. Locomotive Eng'rs, 116 F. Supp. 3 (D.D.C. 1953). 
n International Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Foust, 442 U.S. 42 (1979). 
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on the grounds that punitive damages "could impair the 
financial stability of unions and unsettle the careful balance of 
individual and collective interests which this court has previ-
ously articulated in the unfair representation area. "88 Similarly, 
in a case involving issues analogous to fair representation, the 
United States District Court for the District of Columbia faced 
the task of assessing purely compensatory damages against a 
union which had used pension fund assets for its own purposes 
to the detriment of retirees. The court expressly limited the 
union's liability. Because the union protects the interests of both 
past and prospective beneficaries, the court did not want to 
weaken the union financially so as to substantially impair its col-
lective bargaining position.89 
Balancing the right of individual retirees to fair compensation 
against the collective need of all those a union represents for a 
viable bargaining representative would be easier if the employer 
could be required to contribute in compensating retirees. Courts 
have awarded damages against employers in fair representation 
suits under a variety of rationales. Generally a court will award 
damages in circumstances where an independent ground of em-
ployer liability was present. For example, where an employer vi-
olates a collective bargaining agreement and employees file a 
grievance which a union fails to process fairly, damages may be 
awarded against both the union and the employer. The damages 
awarded against the union are for failure to represent the em-
ployees fairly. Awards against the employer, however, are for 
breach of the collective bargaining agreement and must be lim-
ited to the provable damages occasioned thereby;'0 However, 
some courts have indicated that even where no independent 
ground of liability exists, employers may be joined in fair repre-
sentation suits to afford "complete relief."·0 In the context of 
mos_t decided cases, affording "complete relief' means requiring 
employers to reinstate previous seniority or job status to em-
ployees injured by discriminatory contractual provisions advo-
cated by the union and agreed to by the employer, and to con-
tribute in compensating the victim.•2 Several courts have 
18 Id. at 49. 
•• Blankership v. Boyle, 329 F. Supp. 1089 (D.D.C. 1971). 
•• Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967); Barrett v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 395 F. Supp. 161 
(W.D. Mo. 1973). 
•• Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967); Glover v. St. L.S.F. Ry., 393 U.S. 324,329 (1969); 
Cunningham v. Erie Ry., 266 F.2d 790 (7th Cir. 1974); see Carroll v. Brotherhood of R.R. 
Trainmen, 417 F.2d 1025 (1st Cir. 1969) . 
.. See, e.g., Butler v. Local 823, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 514 F.2d 442 (8th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 423 U.S. 924 (1975). 
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allowed joinder of employers in fair representation suits on the 
broader theory that the employer has a duty analagous to that 
of the union to refrain from conduct at the bargaining table that 
discriminates against particular classes of employees. 43 
Although the theoretical distinction is clear, the practical dif-
ference in breach of fair representation cases between inciden-
tally joining an employer to afford complete relief and indepen-
dently joining an employer as one who aids and abets the union 
is hazy at best. Regardless of the theory, courts tend to find em-
ployer conduct culpable where a union proposal constitutes 
clearly identifiable discrimination against a class, and the em-
ployer has no legitimate business reasons for agreeing to it. Such 
cases often involve racial discrimination, 44 discrimination against 
non-members,411 or destruction of the accrued benefits of partic-
•• Richardson v. Texas & New Orleans R.R., 242 F.2d 230 (5th Cir. 1957); Jones v. 
Trans World Airlines, Inc., 495 F.2d 790, 798 (2d Cir. 1974). In Richardson, the union 
and the employer had agreed to contractual terms discriminating against black employ-
ees who were not union members but whom the union represented. The plaintiffs 
brought suit against both the union and the employer. In ruling that the action against 
the employer should not be dismissed, the court held the employer jointly responsible for 
violating its independent duty to represent fairly the black employees: 
It takes two parties to reach an agreement, and both have a legal obligation 
not to make or enforce an agreement or discriminatory employment practice 
which they know, or should know, is unlawful. Unless financial responsibility for 
a joint breach of such duty is required from both sides of the bargaining table, 
the statutory policy implied under Steele will be impracticable of enforcement. 
For the foregoing reasons, we think the Brotherhood's obligation under the stat-
ute does not exist in vacuo, unsupported by any commensurate duty on the 
part of the carrier. 
The Railroad may not have been the Brotherhood's keeper for bargaining pur-
poses, but we think that, under the allegations of this complaint, it can be 
required to respond in damages for breach of its own duty not to join in caus-
ing or perpetuating a violation of the Act and that policy it is supposed to 
effectuate. 
242 F.2d at 236. (emphasis added). In Glover v. Saint L.S.F. Ry., 393 U.S. 324 (1969), a 
subsequent Supreme Court case involving negotiation of racially discriminatory provi-
sions, Justice Harlan enhanced the vigor of Richardson, stating: "I believe that Richard-
son v. Texas & N.O.R. Co., 242 F.2d 230 (1957), decided by the Fifth Circuit some years 
ago before the decision in the present case, also supports today's holding that the federal 
courts may grant ... relief against an employer who aids and abets [the] union in 
breaching its duty of fair representation." 393 U.S. at 331 (Harlan, J., concurring). The 
Supreme Court also cited Richardson favorably in Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 186 
(1967). 
" See, e.g., Steele v. Louisville & N. R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944); Richardson v. Texas & 
New Orleans R.R., 242 F.2d 230 (5th Cir. 1957). These cases were decided prior to the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1976), which imposed an independent duty 
upon employers to refrain from racial discrimination. Therefore, relief against the em-
ployer was premised upon employer bargaining conduct, not upon an independent viola-
tion of the civil rights laws. 
•• Jones v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 495 F.2d 790 (2d Cir. 1974). 
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ular employees.48 Some courts have ruled that an employer may 
be held liable even where it may have a legitimate business rea-
son for agreeing to the offending clause.47 
Nevertheless, under present law, whether courts would penal-
ize employers for agreeing to inadequate union proposals made 
for retiree benefits is highly questionable for two reasons. First, 
employers agreeing to inadequate increases would not deprive 
anyone of accrued benefits. Second, by its very nature, collective 
bargaining presupposes an important and legitimate employer 
interest in protecting its pocketbook. Therefore, courts would 
certainly be reluctant to penalize employers for acting in their 
self-interest. 
Making the subject of retirees' benefits a mandatory subject of 
bargaining will not by itself provide any reliable guarantee of 
adequate benefit increases for retirees. Both the internal politi-
cal dynamics of most unions and employer interests dictate that 
retiree benefits be given only secondary consideration at the bar-
gaining table. In addition, the doctrine of fair representation 
gives unions wide latitude in settling upon their bargaining pri-
orities. Moreover, whether retirees could expect adequate com-
pensation even if they were able to prove a breach of the duty of 
fair representation, is highly unlikely. In order for mandatory 
bargaining over retirees' benefits to be meaningful, additional 
protections have to be extended to retirees. 
II. ALTERNATIVES TO STRENGTHEN THE RIGHTS OF RETIREES 
WITHIN THE BARGAINING PROCESS 
A number of alternatives exist to strengthen the position of 
retirees in the collective bargaining context. These include 
allowing retirees to bargain for themselves, increasing the con-
sultative role of retirees in the bargaining process, establishing a 
higher than ordinary standard for retiree benefits, and negotiat-
ing automatic cost-of-living adjustments for post-retirement 
•• Id.; Barton Brands, Ltd. v. NLRB, 529 F.2d 793 (7th Cir. 1976). 
41 Barton Brands, Ltd. v. NLRB, 529 F.2d 793 (7th Cir. 1976) (legitimate business 
concerns inherently destructive of important employee rights do not excuse discrimina• 
tory conduct); Jones v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 495 F.2d 790, 798 (2d Cir. 1974) (re• 
gardless of motive, employer liable as "direct cause" of plaintiffs' injuries by violating 
seniority rights accrued under previous contracts); see Robinson v. Lorrilard Corp., 444 
F.2d 791, 799 (4th Cir. 1971); cf. Ferro v. Railway Express Agency Inc., 296 F.2d 847, 851 
(2d Cir. 1969) (employer dismissed from suit in absence of allegation that employer had 




Retired Workers and Inflation 
A. The Right of Retirees to Bargain for Themselves 
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Retirees undoubtedly would fare best if they had an official 
voice in developing and approving collective bargaining agree-
ments. Under the law, however, "subject to reasonable rules and 
regulations," only union members are guaranteed the right to 
equal participation i.n union affairs, including collective bargain-
ing matters. 48 Thus, unions, in their capacity as collective bar-
gaining agents, may exclude non-members they represent from 
official participation in decisions affecting collective bargain-
ing. 49 Furthermore, unions are free to set their own conditions of 
membership.60 Because unions generally deny membership to re-
tirees, retirees are effectively denied official participation in 
union affairs bearing upon collective bargaining. 
An alternative supported strongly by some advocates for retir-
ees61 is to amend the law to allow retirees to bargain directly 
with employers. Presumably, retirees and active workers would 
be members of separate bargaining units, and each bargaining 
unit would be free to choose its own bargaining agent. 
Such a structure raises troublesome technical questions in-
cluding who would be included in a retiree unit, would the unit 
include only retirees actually receiving pensions, or would it also 
include retirees who had never qualified for pensions but felt 
they should be entitled to them, and if those in the latter cate-
gory are to be included, is there to be some minimum duration 
of employment with the employer prerequisite to inclusion in 
the unit? These questions have more than a theoretical impor-
tance. If retirees are empowered to choose their own bargaining 
agent, membership in the unit will determine who is to vote on 
that choice. 
A more fundamental problem is that separate bargaining units 
with the right to separate representation would institutionalize 
an adversial relationship in which retirees and active workers 
overtly compete for benefits. Under such a structure, retirees 
•• Title IV, 401, LMRDA, 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(l) (1976). 
•• Branch 6000, Nat'! Ass'n of Letter Carriers v. NLRB, 595 F.2d 808, 811 (D.C. Cir. 
1979) (deciding upon the terms of a collective bargaining agreement is a union function 
"from which non-union employees properly may be excluded"). 
00 See note 11 supra. 
•• See Collective Bargaining for Retired Employees: Hearings on H.R. 13535 before 
the Subcomm. on Labor-Management Relations of the House Education and Labor 
Comm., 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 63-64 (1978) (testimony of Jay W. Tower). 
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would be at a severe disadvantage. By striking, active workers 
can directly shut down an employer's operations. Retirees can-
not command such direct action in support of their demands. 
Thus, common sense dictates that an employer should resolve 
separate and competing demands made upon it in favor of active 
workers. 
Retirees dissatisfied with an employer's off er would be forced 
to rely upon indirect pressures, perhaps in the form of consumer 
boycotts and informational picketing. However, consumer boy-
cotts are difficult to mount, and informational picketing is a rel-
atively weak form of pressure. Moreover, the public would al-
most certainly become confused by conflict between retirees and 
active workers, further diminishing the effectiveness of these 
tactics. In the event active workers were still on the job when 
retirees reached impasses with an employer, retirees might pick-
et job sites in the hope active workers would walk out in sympa-
thy. Yet retirees and active workers would be competing for ben-
efits. By walking off the job, active workers would gain nothing 
for themselves, and they would lose their paychecks. The incen-
tives to ignore retiree pickets would be substantial. 112 
Commonly, unions negotiating simultaneously with an em-
ployer coordinate their efforts. Bargaining and striking in tan-
dem enhances their strength while bargaining and striking sepa-
rately dilutes their strength. Therefore, cooperation measurably 
increases the chances for success. Little reason exists, however, 
for a union representing active workers to agree to coordinate 
bargaining with retirees. Retirees, having no jobs, can neither 
participate in a joint strike, nor detract from the strength of uni-
lateral action by active workers. Because retirees can do little to 
help or hurt active workers and are competing with them for 
benefits, a union representing active workers probably would not 
agree to coordinate bargaining with retirees. 
B. Increased Retiree Role in the Process of Union 
Bargaining 
To guarantee retirees an official voice in union decisions on 
collective bargaining would require novel and massive intrusions 
into the traditional legal hegemony accorded to unions over con-
ditions of membership and execution of their duties as bargain-
•• This leaves aside questions concerning the legality of such picketing which need not 
be discussed here. The basic point is that sympathy strike efforts would probably be 
unsuccessful in any event. 
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ing agents. Nothing, however, prohibits the imposition of an ex-
plicit duty upon unions to consult with retirees they represent 
before and during collective bargaining negotiations. The posi-
tion that unions should consult non-members is already inherent 
in existing judicial precedent. The Supreme Court in Steele, 
stated: 
While the statute does not deny to such a bargaining 
labor organization the right to determine eligibility to its 
membership it does require the union, in collective bar-
gaining and in making contracts with the carrier, to re-
present non-union or minority· union members of the 
craft without hostile discrimination, fairly, impartially, 
and in good faith. Whenever necessary to that end, the 
union is required to consider requests of non-union 
members of the craft and expressions of their views with 
respect to collective bargaining with the employer and 
to give them notice of an opportunity for hearing upon 
its proposed action. 58 
Greater involvement by retirees in the bargaining process 
would not, by itself, insure larger or more frequent benefit ad-
justments. In fact, greater involvement in the bargaining process 
would mean little if the union, after consultation with retirees, 
did not make retirees' interests a high priority. To insure that 
unions make the interests of retirees a high priority in bargain-
ing, a higher than ordinary standard of fair representation to the 
negotiation of benefits for retirees might be appropriate. 
C. A Higher than Ordinary Standard of Fair Representation 
Some precedent exists for higher than ordinary standards of 
fair representation in two -lines of analogous cases involving ra-
cially discriminatory contractual provisions114 and union repre-
sentation of non-members.66 The two principles embodied in 
these cases are complementary and conjoined in their applicabil-
ity to retirees. 
One line of decisions relies upon the applicability of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits unions from encouraging 
08 Steele, 323 U.S. at 204 (emphasis added). 
"' See, e.g., Patterson v. American Tobacco Co., 535 F.2d 257 (4th Cir. 1976). 
06 See, e.g., Jones v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 495 F.2d 790 (2d Cir. 1974). 
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employers to discriminate on a racial basis. 116 Several circuits 
have required unions, not merely to refrain from racial discrimi-
nation, but to negotiate actively for equal treatment of racial mi-
norities.117 The principle common to these cases is that the vindi-
cation of important public policies must take precedence over 
the union's normal right to compromise and trade off interests 
of groups it represents during bargaining. Pension stability, like 
equal opportunity for minorities, is a paramount public concern. 
When passing the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 
1974 (ERISA),118 Congress found that: 
[T]he growth in size, scope, anci numbers of employee 
benefit plans in recent years has been rapid and substan-
tial ... that the continued well-being and security of 
millions of employees and their dependents are directly 
affected by these plans; that they are affected with a na-
tional public interest; that they have become an impor-
tant factor affecting the stability of employment and the 
successful development of industrial relations .... 119 
Under ERISA, Congress has protected the soundness of pri-
vate pension plans "by requiring them to vest the accrued bene-
fits of employees with significant periods of service, to meet the 
minimum standards of funding, and by requiring plan termina-
tion insurance."60 Yet, without measures such as a special stan-
dard of fair representation adequate to ensure the stability of 
pension values over time, these protections are meaningless. 
In the second line of cases, courts have indicated that union 
representation of non-members, especially those to whom union 
membership is categorically denied, is subject to special scru-
tiny. 61 Because unions have little institutional motivation to pro-
mote the interests of nonmembers, efforts in behalf of non-mem-
bers should be subject to close review. 
Retirees generally are not members of the unions representing 
them. Even where retirees are union members, they have limited 
08 Title VII, § 703 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c)(3) (1976). 
07 Patterson v. American Tobacco Co., 535 F.2d 257, 270 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 
U.S. 920 (1976); Macklin v. Spector Freight Systems, Inc., 478 F.2d 979, 989 (D.C. Cir. 
1973); see also United States v. N.L. Industries, Inc., 479 F.2d 354, 379 (8th Cir. 1973). 
08 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001 et seq. (1976). 
•• Id. § 1002(a). 
•• Title I, § 2(c), ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § lOOl(a) (1976). 
•• Berault v. Local 40, Super Cargoes & Checkers, l.L. & W.U., 445 F. Supp. 1287, 
1295 (D.Ore. 1978) (unions must be especially careful to represent interests of those to 
whom they categorically deny membership); see Jones v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 495 
F.2d 790, 797 (7th Cir. 1974). 
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bonds with the union representing them. The Supreme Court 
recognized this in Pittsburgh Plate Glass and grounded its con-
clusion that retirees were not "bargaining unit members" upon 
the lack of a real "community of interests" between active work-
ers and retirees which might tempt unions to favor the interests 
of active workers.82 The Supreme Court relied upon this lack of 
a community of interests to deny retirees effective bargaining 
representation, ruling that unions could not force employers to 
negotiate over retiree benefits. However, the Supreme Court's 
logic is curious. Concluding that because retirees might not re-
ceive adequate representation from unions, the Supreme Court 
ruled they do not have to receive any. The lack of strong bonds 
between unions and retirees more logically leads to the opposite 
conclusion - that unions should be held to higher than ordinary 
standards of representation to insure proper advocacy of retiree 
interests. 
A special standard of representation for retirees rights might 
take the form of a "rebuttable presumption." A rebuttable pre-
sumption would set a particular standard which a union would 
be required to meet in its attempts to negotiate benefits for re-
tirees. H the union failed to negotiate benefit levels which met 
that standard, in the absence of justification for its failure, the 
union would be found to have breached its duty of fair represen-
tation to retirees. 
1. Defining a higher standard of fair representation- As-
suming a higher than ordinary standard of fair representation 
for measuring bargaining conduct affecting retirees, and assum-
ing a rebuttable presumption, a specific "yardstick" against 
which fair bargaining conduct can be measured would be in or-
der. Such a yardstick might require unions to strive for retiree 
benefit increases sufficient to offset the effects of inflation over 
the preceding contract, or if increases at this level would out-
strip those to which active workers would be entitled, to attempt 
at a minimum to achieve benefit increases equal to wage in-
creases negotiated for active workers.88 Benefits not meeting this 
standard would be presumptively invalid and require a union to 
justify its actions by reference to some legitimate union objec-
tive. Deciding what constitutes a "legitimate union objective" is 
open to controversy and would vary with the circumstances. It 
suffices to say that the union would be required to demonstrate 
.. Pittsburgh Plate Glaaa, 404 U.S. at 173 . 
.. Defining the criteria for "increases sufficient to offset the effects of inflation" and 
"increases proportionate to wage increases" is beyond the scope of this article. 
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specifically why it could not comply with the presumptive stan-
dard. There is precedent for applying such a presumption to 
union bargaining conduct. Several cases hold that where a union 
attempts to cancel or reduce benefits already .conferred upon a 
minority in a pre-existing agreement, the union breaches its 
duty of fair representation to the minority unless it demon-
strates "some objective justification for its conduct."64 The eq-
uity of this requirement is applicable to pension increases nego-
tiated for retirees because in a very real way union failure to 
attempt to adjust pensions for inflation on some equitable basis 
erodes pension value, denying "accrued" benefits to retirees. 
2. Applying the standard to employers- Even with a but-
tressed right to fair representation, retirees would have little real 
protection if employers were allowed at will to refuse to agree to 
union proposals complying with the presumptive· standard, or 
were allowed to agree to inadequate union proposals. As dis-
cussed in Part II C above, ample precedent exists for holding 
bargaining employers liable to vindicate employee rights involv-
ing important public policy, such as racial equality. The pre-
sumptive standard should extend to cover employers bargaining 
over issues affecting pension stability. In opposition, arguably, 
the imposition of a presumptive formula for pension increases, 
which interferes directly with financial management, infringes 
upon an employer's legitimate business interests in a way that a 
duty to refrain from racial discrimination does not. However, a 
presumptive standard dictates only the shape - not the size -
of settlements. Furthermore, the standard could allow for devia-
tions, which in the case of employers could include those devia-
tions justified by legitimate business concerns. Holding employ-
ers liable for breaching a duty to negotiate adequate pension 
increases for retirees would allow the courts to spread the risk of 
damages where inadequate increases were negotiated. Such risk 
spreading would lessen the possibility that courts would have to 
choose between awarding adequate compensation to retirees and 
crippling a union financially, rendering it unable to function ef-
fectively in the future as a bargaining agent. 
3. A yardstick for compensation- A presumptive standard 
that benefits for retirees should be enough to offset inflation or, 
in the alternative, equal benefits negotiated for active workers 
would provide an objective criterion against which to measure 
damages. This would prevent courts from engaging in the ~nbri-
.. Barton Brands, Ltd. v. NLRB, 529 F.2d 793, 800 (7th Cir. 1976); Deboles v. Trans 
World Airlines, Inc., 552 F.2d 1005, 1016 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 837 (1977). 
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died speculation as to what should have been negotiated. Using 
the presumptive standard as a yardstick does not mean that the 
courts would award damages equivalent to the presumptive 
standard in every case. Rather, the presumptive standard would 
be a starting point for deliberation, and the courts would be free 
to award lesser damages or no damages, after taking into ac-
count mitigating conditions confronting the union and employer 
at the time of bargaining. 
D. Automatic Cost-of-Living Adjustments 
Another alternative to relying on the collective bargaining 
process to yield ad hoc benefit adjustments to protect pension 
. values is to make automatic adjustments in retiree benefits 
which are indexed either to inflation or wage increases for active 
workers. 
Automatic cost-of-living wage protection (COLA) has long 
been a goal of unions. Today, while many labor contracts, con-
tain some form of automatic wage adjustment process, COLA 
protection for retirement benefits has not been as high a prior-
ity. Why this is so is open to some speculation. One theory holds 
that the collective bargaining process itself places a premium on 
the ad hoc adjustment process. Ad hoc adjustments permit both 
parties to an agreement to demonstrate that improvements have 
been granted. Evidence of this is the fact most collectively bar-
gained private sector pension plans are of the flat-benefit type 
rather than the final-pay type. Final-pay plans provide for auto-
matic increases in the benefit levels in a pension plan as the sal-
aries or wages of the participants increase. Neither type of plan, 
however, protects against value loss due to inflation after 
retirement. 
In its February 1981 Final Report, the President's Commis-
sion on Pension Policy concluded that steps should be taken 
regarding tax policy to encourage individuals, companies, and 
unions to make voluntary arrangements for cost-of-living protec-
tion. While the Commission did not believe that a recommenda-
tion for mandatory cost-of-living protection was appropriate at 
this time, its tax proposals reflected the awareness on the part of 
the Commission of the need for cost-of-living protection.611 
Whether these proposals would affect the bargaining process in 
the future is a matter for future research and public comment . 
.. See generally PRESIDENT'S COMM. ON PENSION POLICY, COMING OF AGE: TOWARD A 
NATIONAL RETIREMENT INCOME POLICY (1981). 
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Reliance solely upon the current collective bargaining struc-
ture to assure pension increases adequate to offset inflation is 
probably misplaced for three reasons. First, even where a union 
vigorously pursues the interests of retirees at the bargaining ta-
ble, the employer is under no legal obligation to discuss the issue 
of pension increases for retirees. Second, the dynamics dictated 
by the internal structures of most unions do not encourage spe-
cial attention to the needs of retirees. Third, prevailing stan-
dards of fair representation, even assuming their eventual appli-
cability to retirees, are inadequate to enforce a level of 
representation for retirees that would produce consistent protec-
tion from inflation. 
One suggestion to strengthen the bargaining position of retir-
ees has been to allow retirees to bargain for themselves. While 
independent bargaining would put retirees in charge of their 
own fate, it would also put them in overt competition with active 
workers for benefits. Because in comparison to active workers 
retirees have little power to enforce their demands, this sugges-
tion is probably self-defeating. Another possibility is to grant re-
tirees the right to participate in official union decision-making 
processes connected with the formulation of bargaining demands 
and the approval of collective bargaining agreements. Undoubt-
edly this would enhance greatly the control that retirees have 
over collective bargaining deliberations which vitally affect their 
welfare. Nevertheless, to extend this right to retirees would re-
quire Congress to infringe directly upon the hegemony over in-
ternal affairs traditionally accorded to unions. 
A less drastic alternative, which nevertheless would increase 
the bargaining strength of retirees, would be to require union 
officials to consult with retirees before making collective bar-
gaining decisions affecting them. Holding unions to a higher 
than normal standard of fair representation would reinforce this 
consultative role for retirees. In addition, under certain circum-
stances, employers could be made jointly liable with unions for 
depriving retirees of adequate pension increases. Whether these 
innovations would be sufficient to maintain pension values is, at 
this time, purely speculative. Consequently, serious considera-
tion should be given also to additional or alternative reforms 
outside the collective bargaining process - such as required au-
tomatic cost-of-living adjustments for pensions - which directly 
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support the living standards of retirees without reliance upon 
intermediaries. 

